Corporate Governance and the Value of Excess Cash Holdings of Large European Firms by Schauten, M.B.J. (Marc) et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance and the Value of Excess Cash 
Holdings of Large European Firms 
 
 
Marc B.J. Schauten, Dick van Dijk and Jan-Paul van der Waal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERIM REPORT SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
ERIM Report Series reference number ERS-2008-027-F&A 
Publication  May 2008 
Number of pages 37 
Persistent paper URL http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12465 
Email address corresponding author djvandijk@few.eur.nl 
Address  Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
 RSM Erasmus University / Erasmus School of Economics  
 Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
 P.O.Box 1738  
 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Phone:  + 31 10 408 1182   
Fax: + 31 10 408 9640 
Email:  info@erim.eur.nl 
Internet:  www.erim.eur.nl
 
Bibliographic data and classifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:  
www.erim.eur.nl 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
 
REPORT SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS 
Abstract We examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance and the value of excess 
cash for large European firms (FTSEurofirst 300 Index). We use Deminor ratings for Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board as proxies for the quality of corporate 
governance. We find that the value of excess cash is positively related to the Takeover defences 
score only. It seems that governance mechanisms—except the market for corporate control—
are not strong enough to prevent managers from wasting excess cash. For non-UK firms we find 
that the value of €1 of excess cash in a poorly governed firm is valued at only €0.89 while the 
value is €1.45 for a good governed firm. We show that poorly governed firms dissipate excess 
cash relatively quickly with a negative impact on their operating performance as a result. 
Free Keywords corporate governance, excess cash, take-over defences 
Availability The ERIM Report Series is distributed through the following platforms:  
Academic Repository at Erasmus University (DEAR), DEAR ERIM Series Portal
Social Science Research Network (SSRN), SSRN ERIM Series Webpage
Research Papers in Economics (REPEC), REPEC ERIM Series Webpage
Classifications The electronic versions of the papers in the ERIM report Series contain bibliographic metadata 
by the following classification systems: 
Library of Congress Classification, (LCC) LCC Webpage
Journal of Economic Literature, (JEL), JEL Webpage
ACM Computing Classification System CCS Webpage
Inspec Classification scheme (ICS), ICS Webpage
 
 
 
 1
 
Corporate governance and the value of excess cash holdings 
of large European firms 
 
 
Marc B.J. Schauten*   Dick van Dijk 
    Department of Finance    Econometric Institute 
    Erasmus University Rotterdam   Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
Jan-Paul van der Waal 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
May 14, 2008 
 
 
Abstract 
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prevent managers from wasting excess cash. For non-UK firms we find that the value 
of €1 of excess cash in a poorly governed firm is valued at only €0.89 while the value 
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1 Introduction 
We study the impact of corporate governance on the value of excess cash holdings by 
firms. Jensen (1986) argues that poorly monitored managers of publicly listed 
companies may waste free cash by investing money in value decreasing projects. In 
this context corporate governance could be of great value, if it protects shareholders 
against such mismanagement and irresponsible dissipation of cash.  
In the absence of any market imperfections, the value of €1 on the bank account of 
firms should be valued equally by the capital market. However, in practice it is 
possible that management invests this €1 in a project that is worth less. These agency 
costs (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976) imply that the €1 held within the firm will be 
valued at a discount. The higher the probability of misallocation of cash holdings 
under management's control, the lower its market value. Good corporate governance 
could lower this probability of “wasting” by management and as such increase the 
value of firms’ cash holdings.  
If firms held only little amounts of cash, the sketched problem would be of minor 
importance. However, firms’ cash holdings often are substantial. For the largest 
publicly listed European firms the sum of cash and cash equivalents was more than 
13% of net assets (total assets minus cash) in the year 2000, while by 2005 this 
percentage had even increased to almost 17%.1 For some individual firms these 
percentages are much higher. For example, cash holdings by H & M Hennes & 
Mauritz from Sweden were 52% and 103% of net assets in 2000 and 2005, 
respectively. Firm’s cash holdings also are very volatile. For example, AFC Ajax 
NV's cash holdings varied from 79% in 1998 (the IPO year of ACF Ajax) via 18% in 
2000 to 27% in 2005. If agency problems did not exist, there would be no valuation 
problem, even if the cash holdings are at such high and volatile levels as observed in 
practice. However, if shareholders fear misallocation of firm’s cash by the incumbent 
management, the negative effects on the valuation of the firm can be huge. 
A large body of literature explores the influence of corporate governance on the 
return on equity, firm value and firm performance, see Nesbitt (1994, 1995), Yermack 
(1996), Core et al. (1999), Gompers et al. (2003), Bauer et al. (2004), Bebchuk et al. 
(2005), Cremers and Nair (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006) and Core et al. (2006), 
                                                 
1 Or 11.5% and 14.5% as percentage of total assets. The percentage of cash holdings for large publicly 
traded U.S. firms in 2003 was 13%, see Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).  
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among others. However, previous literature has not related the quality of corporate 
governance directly to the value of firm-level cash holdings. A notable exception is 
Pinkowitz et al. (2006), who study the relationship between cash holdings and firm 
value and the influence of governance on that relationship in an international context 
using a sample of firms from 35 countries. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) find that a dollar 
increase in cash holdings is worth roughly a dollar in countries with strong investor 
protection, but much less than a dollar in countries with poor investor protection. 
Other papers that deal with the value of cash are Faulkender and Wang (2006) and 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005). Both papers study the marginal value of cash but 
without taking corporate governance into consideration. Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
find amongst other things that the marginal value of cash holdings declines with the 
amount of cash holdings and with leverage, while Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005) 
document that the value of cash depends on both the investment and financing 
opportunity sets of the firm. Specifically, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005) find that 
firms with good growth options have their cash valued at a premium relative to firms 
with poor growth prospects and that nearer financial distress and access to capital 
decreases the value of cash. 
In this paper we focus on the effects of corporate governance on the value of 
excess cash, as this part of cash holdings is most easily accessible by management to 
derive “private benefits”. As pointed out by Myers and Rajan (1998), it is easier to 
make cash disappear than to make a plant disappear. We argue that it is even easier to 
make excess cash disappear, as this part of the firm’s cash holdings is not needed for 
other, economically motivated purposes such as financing new investment 
opportunities. We are interested in the valuation of excess cash by the market and 
especially in the influence of corporate governance on this valuation. A first attempt 
to examine this issue was made by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) for U.S. firms. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that governance has a positive effect on the 
value of excess cash and on the marginal value of total cash. In particular, the market 
value of excess cash for firms that have poor internal or external corporate 
governance in the form of extensive anti-takeover provisions and a low level of large 
shareholder monitoring, respectively, is found to be approximately one-half of the 
value of excess cash for firms that are well governed. Depending on the measure of 
corporate governance, the marginal value of $1.00 held by a poorly governed firm 
varies between $0.42 and $0.88, compared to $1.27 to $1.62 for a well governed firm. 
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Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) further show that poorly governed firms dissipate 
cash more quickly2 and in such a way that they experience lower operating 
performance. Explanations given by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) for the lower 
value of (excess) cash for poorly governed firms are that these firms invest (more) 
money in low return projects3 and that excess cash may make managers “lazy” in the 
sense that it reduces their incentives to control costs, improve margins etc.  
In contrast to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), our study analyses the relation 
between four specific governance mechanisms and excess cash, i.e. Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board functioning. Our unique governance 
dataset provided by Deminor4 makes it possible to pinpoint which governance 
provisions influence the value of excess cash and which ones do not. In addition, we 
focus on the effects of corporate governance on the value of excess cash for a sample 
of large publicly listed European firms. 
To determine the effects of corporate governance on the value of excess cash we 
follow the methodology of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). We first use a cash 
model based on Opler et al. (1999) to determine the level of normal or “optimal” cash 
holdings and define excess cash as the difference between the actual cash holdings 
and the predicted normal cash holdings. We then employ value regressions as used in 
Fama and French (1998) and return regressions as used by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) to determine the value of (positive) excess cash. 
Our main empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the 
value of excess cash is positively related to the score for the corporate governance 
                                                 
2 This finding is in accordance with Harford et al. (2008) who document a positive relation between 
corporate governance and cash reserves for U.S. firms. Cross-country (worldwide) evidence also shows 
that greater shareholder rights are associated with lower cash holdings, see e.g., Dittmar et al. (2003) 
and Pinkowitz et al. (2004). 
3 Harford et al. (2008) find that poorly governed U.S. firms dissipate their cash reserves more quickly 
primarily on value-reducing acquisitions than well governed firms, see also Harford (1999). Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007), however, show that the value effects of excess cash and the reduction in 
operating performance cannot fully be explained by spending excess cash on acquisitions. 
4 Deminor offers since 1993 corporate governance ratings. Deminor was acquired by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) in 2005. ISS was acquired by RiskMetrics in 2007.  
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measure of Takeover defences.5 In other words, excess cash held by firms with less 
anti-takeover provisions (low management rights) is valued higher than excess cash 
held by more protected firms (high management rights). Other corporate governance 
measures do not have a significant effect on the valuation of excess cash. For non-UK 
firms we find that the value of €1 of excess cash is only €0.89 for the lower Takeover 
defences quartile and €1.45 for the upper quartile. We interpret this finding as 
follows. The value of excess cash of firms with high management rights is relatively 
low, because the capital market cannot correct nor prevent the misuse of these cash 
holdings. Cash holdings of these firms are accordingly valued below “face value”. On 
the other hand, firms with low management rights run the risk of being taken over if 
they destroy value (now or probably in the future) by investing in negative NPV 
projects or by operating extremely inefficient. Because of this threat of control over 
the amount of excess cash, the probability that it will be allocated wrongly is smaller 
and hence excess cash is valued higher.  
Second, we find that firms with more anti-takeover provisions hold relatively less 
(excess) cash. In addition, those firms with high management rights spend their excess 
cash more quickly and on less profitable investments than firms with low 
management rights (that is, high governance scores). This indicates that indeed well 
governed firms operate under the fear of the capital market for misallocation of their 
excess cash holdings. The other governance mechanisms do not seem to be strong 
enough to convince the capital market that management will act in the shareholders’ 
best interests. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the Deminor 
governance data. In section 3 we present the models we use to estimate normal and 
excess cash levels and the relation between corporate governance and the value of 
excess cash. Data and summary statistics on cash are provided in the same section. In 
section 4 we report our empirical results. We conclude in Section 5.   
 
                                                 
5 Anti-takeover provisions that prevent a successful acquisition by a bidder are seen as an indication of 
poor corporate governance. This is comparable with the interpretation of the Gompers et al. (2003) 
measure. 
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2 Corporate governance data 
We use Deminor ratings to measure the quality of firm-level corporate governance. 
These ratings cover firms included in the FTSEurofirst 300 Index for the years 2000-
2004. The Deminor ratings are based on 300 different governance indicators that refer 
to internationally accepted standards, as outlined by the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the Conference Board (Deminor Rating, 
2004).6,7 The different indicators or criteria can be classified into four categories: 
rights and duties of shareholders (referred to as Shareholder rights in the remainder of 
the paper); range of takeover defences (Takeover defences); disclosure on financial 
matters and corporate governance (Disclosure); and Board structure and functioning 
(Board). For each category a rating is available on a scale from 1 to 10, where a score 
of 10 (1) corresponds to the best (worst) possible governance quality. The total 
governance score is simply the sum of the rating scores of the four categories. 
The first category of governance criteria, Shareholder rights, concerns the question 
whether shareholders can exert sufficient power to determine corporate action. The 
score is based on i) the 'one share - one vote - one dividend' principle; ii) access to and 
voting procedures at general meetings, and iii) maintenance of pre-emptive rights. 
Firms that respect the control and ownership roles of shareholders, score high on the 
'one share - one vote - one dividend' principle. Deminor evaluates whether companies 
submit voting issues that are perceived as particularly significant to the general 
meeting of shareholders and assesses the voting structure. Furthermore, companies 
should respect the pre-emptive rights of the existing shareholders as these 
stakeholders would like to prevent dilution of their voting or economic power. 
The second category, Takeover defences, examines the extent to which the firm 
attempts to decrease the likelihood of a hostile takeover through the adoption of anti-
                                                 
6 The Deminor rating methodology further takes into consideration the main orientations chosen by 
national Codes of Best Practice, among which: the Combined Code in the UK (2003); the Vienot 
reports and the Bouton report in France (1995, 1999 and 2002); the Kodex in Germany (2002); the 
Preda Code in Italy (1999); the Tabaksblat Code in The Netherlands (2003). 
7 About the same criteria are used by Standard & Poor’s for their corporate governance score (Standard 
& Poor's, 2002). This, taken together with the fact that all of these institutions have more or less the 
same ideas concerning good corporate governance, leads us to conclude that the Deminor rating is a 
representative measure for the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. 
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takeover provisions. Deminor examines the presence and strength of anti-takeover 
devices such as poison pills, golden parachutes, core shareholdings and extensive 
cross-shareholdings. To achieve a high score for this aspect of governance, the range 
of takeover defences should lead to a favourable bidding process and not preclude the 
success of a takeover attempt per se. 
The third category, Disclosure, measures whether shareholders are able to obtain 
convenient and comprehensive information about the company's financial matters as 
well as its governance characteristics. Deminor analyses for instance the quantity and 
quality of non-financial information, such as the diversity and independence of board 
members, board committees, accounting standards and information on major 
shareholders of the company. 
The fourth category, Board, measures issues relating to the governance of a Board, 
such as the presence of independent directors, division between the role of Chairman 
and Chief Executive and the election of the board.  
 
- insert Table 1 about here - 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the governance scores for our sample, 
comprising 271 large European firms over the period 2000-2004 (905 firm-year 
observations). We observe a positive trend in the overall governance scores, as well as 
in the sub-scores. The average total score in 2000 is equal to 19.02, which gradually 
increases to 23.84 in 2004. This trend is in line with the increased attention paid to 
governance structures by policy makers, see footnote 6 for a list of National Codes of 
Best Practice, and the subsequent firm actions to improve their corporate governance.8 
 
- insert Table 2 about here - 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the governance scores by country and industry, 
respectively. The extensive investor rights in common law countries such as the 
United Kingdom and Ireland (LaPorta et al., 1998) are confirmed by the relatively 
high governance scores for firms in these countries. The average scores for the United 
                                                 
8 We note that the cross-section of firms varies across the different years in the sample period. We find 
a similar positive trend when restricting the sample to those firms for which ratings are available over 
the complete sample period. 
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Kingdom and Ireland are equal to 27.93 and 28.09, respectively. The average scores 
for these countries are higher than the overall European average for all four 
categories, with the difference being most pronounced for Takeover defences. 
Interestingly, even when leaving the UK and Ireland out of consideration, the cross-
country variation in the average score for Takeover defences is considerably larger 
than for the other three governance categories, ranging between 0.25 for Portugal and 
5.64 for Finland. Also note that the number of observations varies widely across 
countries, from just 2 for Luxembourg to 264 for the UK. 
 
- insert Table 3 about here - 
 
Across industries, we observe from Table 3 that Construction, Metal producers, 
Metal product manufacturers and Tobacco have relatively high total governance 
scores. These relatively high scores are (at least partly) due to the UK country effect 
given that 10 of the 32 Construction observations, 14 of the 15 Metal producers 
observations, 5 of the 10 Metal product manufacturers observations and 14 of the 19 
Tobacco observations concern UK (or Irish) firms. However, controlling for country 
(and year effects), we still find higher total governance scores for the Construction, 
Metal product manufacturers and Tobacco industries.9 
 
3 Models and data 
3.1 Models 
To determine the level of excess cash we first need to estimate the level of normal or 
“optimal” cash holdings for a firm. The regression model that we use for this purpose 
includes variables that are used in prior literature on the determinants of cash holdings 
in imperfect capital markets, including Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004), and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). Our main specification for the 
determination of the level of normal cash holdings is given by 
                                                 
9 To control for country and year effects we regress the total governance scores on country dummies 
and year dummies and compute industry averages for the residuals from this model. In that case, 
besides Construction, Metal product manufacturers and Tobacco also Automotive, Chemicals, 
Electrical, Electronics, Machinery and equipment and Textiles have mean scores above the overall 
average. Below average scores are found for Aerospace, Drugs, cosmetics and health care, Paper and 
Transportation. 
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where (data source codes are listed in Appendix A): Cashi,t = Cash and Cash 
Equivalents of firm i at time t, NAi,t = Net Assets (= Total Assets minus Cash and 
Cash Equivalents) at time t, RealAssetsi,t = Total Assets at time t inflated to 2005 
prices, NWCi,t = Net Working Capital (= Working Capital minus Cash and Cash 
Equivalents) at time t, Sigmai,t = industry average of prior 6 year standard deviation of 
CF/NA, MVi,t = Year-End Market Capitalization plus Total Debt at time t, RDi,t =  
Research and Development expenses (set to 0 if missing) over year t, YFE = Year 
Fixed Effects, and FFE = Firm Fixed Effects.  
Our main specification includes measures for size, cash flow, cash substitutes, risk, 
growth options, and costs of financial distress. These variables are commonly used as 
proxies for the determinants of normal cash holdings that arise through the 
transactions motive and the savings motive, where the latter refers to the incentive to 
accumulate cash for financing new investment opportunities when external finance is 
costly, see Opler et al. (1999). Size plays a double role, in the sense that it acts both as 
a measure of the transactions motive as well as a proxy for access to financial 
markets. Cash flow and net working capital are interpreted as substitutes for cash. The 
market-to-book ratio and R&D expenses serve as proxies for growth opportunities, 
information asymmetry, and financial costs of distress. We expect a negative 
coefficient for size and net working capital and a positive coefficient for growth 
opportunities, R&D expenses and risk. The expected sign for cash flow is positive 
according to the pecking order theory and negative according to the trade-off theory. 
The year dummies are included to account for macroeconomic factors which may 
influence overall demand and supply of liquidity. The firm fixed effects control for 
the fact that due to idiosyncratic reasons some firms may consistently hold higher or 
lower normal cash levels than required for economic reasons. Excess cash is defined 
as the difference between the actual cash holdings and the estimated normal cash 
holdings, that is, the residual from (1). Following Dittmar and Marht-Smith (2007), 
however, we do include the firm fixed effects as part of excess cash, as this does not 
reflect the generally accepted economic reasons for holding cash, such as operational 
 10
needs or future investments.10 As Dittmar and Marht-Smith (2007), we include the 
year fixed effects as part of excess cash as well. 
Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), to determine the effect – if any – of 
corporate governance on the value of excess cash, we estimate value regressions 
based on Fama and French (1998). The dependent variable is the market-to-book 
ratio, which is taken as a measure of total firm value (equity and debt). The regression 
model includes control variables representing factors that are likely to affect 
investors’ expectations of future net cash flows. Specifically, the control variables are 
past changes, future changes, and current levels of earnings, R&D expenses, 
dividends, interest expenses, as well as past and future net assets, and future changes 
of the market value of the firm. Given that we aim to measure the effect of excess 
cash on firm value and, in particular, the influence of corporate governance on this 
effect, we also include excess cash (scaled by net assets) and the interaction between 
the governance score and excess cash. In addition, the governance score itself is 
included to control for the fact that corporate governance may affect firm value also 
through other channels besides excess cash. In sum, for each governance measure, i.e. 
the Total governance score and the sub-scores on Shareholder rights, Takeover 
defences, Disclosure and Board, we estimate the following regression: 
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   (2) 
where dXi,t indicates a change in variable X from time t-1 to t, and MVi,t = Year End 
Market Capitalization plus Total Debt at time t, NAi,t = Net Assets (= Total Assets 
minus Cash and Cash Equivalents) at time t, Ei,t = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(EBIT) over year t, RDi,t =  Research and Development expenses (set to 0 if missing) 
over year t, Divi,t = Common Dividends over year t, Ii,t = Interest Expenses over year 
t, XCashi,t = Excess Cash (= Total Cash and Cash Equivalents minus the normal level 
of cash from equation (1)) at time t, GOVi,t = Governance measure, which is the 
                                                 
10 For example, Foley et al. (2007) show that US multinationals hold cash, in part, as a consequence of 
the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income.    
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governance score for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure or Board, or 
the overall score for these four categories, YFE = Year Fixed Effects and FFE = Firm 
Fixed Effects. We include year fixed and firm fixed effects to capture macroeconomic 
and time trend effects and unobserved heterogeneity and fixed industry effects, 
respectively. 
Because we are interested in the value of a firm’s cash ’surplus’ we estimate the 
value regression using only those firm-year observations for which excess cash is 
positive. The coefficient of key interest in model (2) obviously is β18. If the quality of 
corporate governance positively influences the value of excess cash, this coefficient 
for the interaction term between the governance score and excess cash should be 
positive. 
In addition to the value regression model as given in (2), we estimate an alternative 
model where we focus on value effects of changes in excess cash instead of levels. In 
this model, which is based on Faulkender and Wang (2006), the dependent variable is 
the excess stock return, while the regressors of interest are the change in excess cash 
and its interaction with the governance score. The main specification of this return 
model is given by: 
tii,t
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 (3) 
where, dXi,t indicates a change in X from time t-1 to t, and ri,t = stock return over year 
t, Ri,t = market model return over year t (we estimate the market model using the year 
t-1 arithmetic returns derived from the daily stock return index of each firm and the 
FTSEurofirst 300 Index), XCashi,t = Excess Cash (= Total Cash and Cash Equivalents 
minus the normal level of cash from equation (1)) at time t, MEi,t = Market Value 
equity (= Market Capitalization) at time t, Ei,t = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(EBIT) over year t, NAi,t = Net Assets (= Total Assets minus Cash and Cash 
Equivalents) at time t, RDi,t =  Research and Development expenses (set to 0 if 
missing) over year t, Li,t = Leverage (= Total Debti,t / (Total Debti,t + MEi,t)) at time t, 
NFi,t = New Finance (= Net New Equity Issues (Sale of Common & Preferred stock 
minus Purchase of Common & Preferred Stock) + New Debt Issues (Long Term Debt 
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Issuance minus Long Term Debt Reduction)) over year t, GOVi,t = Governance 
measure and YFE = Year Fixed Effects and FFE = Firm Fixed Effects. In addition to 
the excess return we will also use the percent change in market capitalization (MEi,t-
MEi,t-1)/ MEi,t-1 as dependent variable in (3). 
The control variables in the return regression as given in (3) account for firm-
specific characteristics that may be correlated with both returns and cash holdings due 
to changes in profitability (Ei,t), investment (NAi,t and RDi,t) and financing (Ii,t, Divi,t, 
Li,t and NFi,t), see Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
Again we are interested in the value of a cash surplus, and therefore we estimate 
the return regression on those firm-year observations with positive excess cash at t-1. 
The key coefficient in this model is β12. If the quality of one or more corporate 
governance measures positively influences the value of excess cash, the coefficient 
for the interaction term between the governance score and the change in excess cash 
should be positive. Using the estimates of (3) we can also determine the difference in 
marginal value of €1 held by poorly governed firms compared to well governed firms. 
 
3.2 Data 
Our sample consists of publicly traded European firms that were included in the 
FTSEurofirst 300 Index at some point between 2000 and 2004 and were given a 
governance rating by Deminor. We retrieve data items for these firms—as far as 
available—for the longer period from 1990 to 2005. Firm data is obtained from the 
Worldscope database, Datastream and Thomson Financial Database. Variable 
identifiers are listed in Appendix A. We exclude financial firms (Worldscope Industry 
Group 4300), because their business involves inventories of marketable securities that 
are included in cash, and because of their need to meet statutory capital 
requirements.11 Some firms were excluded from the sample due to data problems.12 
                                                 
11 We do not exclude the Utilities sector as in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) since this would 
seriously limit the size of our sample. 
12 No reliable data could be obtained for Allied Domecq (FIN), Sonera (FR), Orange (FR), Pchiney 
(FR), Rexel (FR), Telecom Italia Mobile (IT) and Terra Networks (SP). Due to mergers also no reliable 
data could be obtained for Royal Dutch Shell and LogicaCMG (UK). In addition, we exclude 
Dampskbselsskabet Svendborg for this company was incorporated twice, with different governance 
ratings. We also exclude Vivendi Environment for this company is a subsidiary of Vivendi which also 
has a Deminor rating. 
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As discussed in Section 2, various aspects of the corporate governance quality of the 
firms is measured by means of the Deminor ratings, which are available for the years 
2000-2004. Year t ratings are published at the beginning of year t+1. 
To mitigate the impact of outliers on our results, we winsorize all variables except 
the governance scores at the mean plus or minus three times the standard deviation. In 
case of ratios, only the ratio is winsorized. The effects of price inflation are handled 
by inflating the variables to 2005 prices, using the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) obtained from the European Central Bank.  
We estimate the normal cash model as given in (1) over the years 1990-2005, and 
both the value regression in (2) and the return regression in (3) over the years 2000-
2004. The maximum number of firm-year observations for the period 1990-2005 is 
3,831, while the maximum number for the period 2000-2004 is 1,340. The sample 
includes observations for 271 unique firms. 
 
- insert Table 4 about here - 
 
Table 4 shows the number of firm-year observations and summary statistics for the 
cash-to-assets ratio per country for the period 1990-2005. The overall mean of the 
cash-to-assets ratio (Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets) is 15.6%. 
Although for most countries the average cash-to-assets ratio is close to this overall 
mean, for some countries it deviates considerably. Switzerland and Ireland have 
relatively high average cash-to-assets ratios of 26.3% and 45.8%, respectively. 
Countries with relatively low cash-to-assets ratios are Austria, Portugal and Spain 
with averages equal to 3.8%, 6.0% and 9.5%, respectively. According to Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004), this cross-country heterogeneity can be a consequence of different 
accounting standards as well as different institutional environments, including 
bankruptcy laws, the state of development of capital markets, and patterns of 
corporate governance.13 
                                                 
13 We note that these cross-country differences in our sample should be interpreted with care, as the 
number of observations for countries such as Ireland, Austria and Portugal are limited. Nevertheless, 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) also report a relatively high average cash-to-assets ratio for Ireland and 
relatively low averages for Austria and Portugal, see also Dittmar et al. (2003). Our overall average 
ratio of 15.6% is rather close to the mean of 14.8% reported by Ferreira and Vilela (2004) for a sample 
of firms from EMU countries over the period 1987-2000. 
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Appendix B presents the same summary statistics for the cash-to-assets ratio per 
country for the shorter period 2000-2004 that is used to estimate the value and return 
regressions. Generally, these correspond quite closely to the numbers in Table 4. 
 
- insert Table 5 about here - 
 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the cash-to-assets ratio by industry for the 
period 1990-2005, while Appendix C shows these for the period 2000-2004. We 
observe substantial differences across industries, with the mean ratio ranging from a 
minimum of 0.034 for Paper to a maximum of 0.283 for Drugs, cosmetics and health 
care, and Electronics. As far as these industry effects are not accounted for by our 
economic regressors in the normal cash model and as long as they are constant over 
time, they will be captured by the firm specific dummies included in (1). 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Cash model 
The results of the cash model are presented in Table 6. Column 1 presents the results 
of our main specification as given in (1). The results of this model are used to 
determine excess cash. In columns 2 and 3, we consider model variations based on 
Opler et al. (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004), which include Leverage (Total 
Debt divided by Net Assets), a Dividend dummy (the dummy equals 1 if a firm pays 
out dividend and 0 otherwise) as well as Capital Expenditures (Capital Expenditures 
divided by Net Assets). We find that cash-to-assets increases with investment 
opportunities (market to book), the magnitude of the cash flow (Cash Flow / Assets), 
industry risk (sigma industry) and R&D expenditures (R&D / Assets). Cash-to-assets 
decreases with liquidity (Net Working Capital / assets). The relation with leverage is 
significantly positive, while there is neither a significant relation with capital 
expenditure nor with dividend and size. These findings are mostly consistent with 
previous empirical studies on the determinants of cash holdings (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004, Opler et al., 1999, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). 
 
- insert Table 6 about here - 
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4.2 Corporate governance and the value of excess cash 
We estimate our value regression as given in (2) on all firm-year observations with 
positive excess cash at time t. Table 7 presents the results. In column 1, we use the 
sum of the four separate governance scores as governance measure, while in columns 
2-5 we use the sub-scores for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and 
Board, respectively. We find that good governance, as measured by the total score, 
has a significantly positive effect on the value of excess cash. The results in columns 
2-5 reveal that this relation is driven purely by the Takeover defences governance 
measure. The coefficient on the interaction term between excess cash and this 
governance measure is positive (0.508) and significant (p-value of 0.038).14 We 
interpret this outcome as follows. The management of firms with a low score for 
Takeover defences have good possibilities to prohibit being acquired by a hostile 
bidder. The ‘management rights’ for these firms are high. If these firms hold excess 
cash and destroy value because of negative NPV projects (such as overpaid 
acquisitions) or inefficiency, the capital market is in the worst case not able to take 
over the firm and to disgorge the cash in order to prevent it from being wasted. The 
value of their excess cash is accordingly, relatively low. However, if well governed 
firms hold excess cash, the capital market can, if she wishes, take over the firm and 
extract the cash if necessary. Because of this threat of control over the amount of 
excess cash, the probability that it will be allocated wrongly is smaller and, hence, 
excess cash is valued higher.  
 
- insert Table 7 about here - 
 
In Table 8, where the governance score is Takeover defences, we report the results 
of alternative specifications. In column 1, we include normal cash as obtained from 
the cash model as extra control variable, while in column 2 we also include the 
interaction term between normal cash and the corporate governance measure 
Takeover defences. As expected, the coefficient on the additional interaction term is 
insignificant. Normal cash as part of cash reserves for daily operations and 
investments is not valued differently between well and poorly governed firms. 
                                                 
14 In untabulated results, we use excess cash as estimated by the models in columns 2 and 3 in Table 6. 
The results confirm the finding that Takeover defences have a significant and positive influence on the 
value of excess cash. 
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However, the interaction term on corporate governance and excess cash remains 
positive and significant, in both columns 1 and 2. In columns 3 and 4, we exclude 
insignificant control variables from our main value specification (column 3 in Table 
7). Our results are robust for these alternative specifications. 
 
- insert Table 8 about here - 
 
Note that since we use the M/B ratio as proxy for growth opportunities in our cash 
model and as proxy for firm value in our value model, it is plausible that the excess 
cash variable in the value model is related to firm value because of investment 
opportunity hedging needs rather than direct value implications. However, our 
coefficient of interest is not the coefficient for Excess cash (in total) but primarily the 
coefficient on the interaction term between excess cash and governance. Although the 
total effect of excess cash on the value of the firm could be biased by the use of M/B 
as proxy for growth in the cash model, we assume this is not the case for the 
coefficient of the interaction term (see Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).15  
Governance may be endogenously determined with value as well (see Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007). In untabulated results, we estimate our value regression using the 
2 year lagged governance score to avoid this endogeneity issue. The results confirm 
that Takeover defences have a significant and positive impact on the value of excess 
cash holdings.  
As an althernative way to determine the effects of corporate governance on the 
value of excess cash and to directly assess the marginal value of excess cash holdings 
we estimate the return model as given in (3). Table 9 presents the results. Given the 
results from the value regressions, we expect that the governance measure Takeover 
defences significantly increases the value of excess cash. Columns 1-3 present the 
results where we use the percent increase of market capitalization as dependent 
variable, while columns 4-6 present results where the market model excess return is 
the dependent variable.  
                                                 
15 If we estimate the cash model with the three year lagged sales growth instead of the M/B ratio as 
proxy for growth opportunities or without proxy for growth opportunities, we still find a significantly 
positive coefficient for the interaction term between excess cash and governance measure Takeover 
defences. The results of these alternative cash models are consistent with the results presented in Table 
8 and Table 9.  
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- insert Table 9 about here - 
 
The results in model [1] confirm that the stock market places a higher value on 
excess cash for well governed firms relative to poorly governed firms. If we split the 
sample in non-UK and UK firms then we find that the coefficient is highly significant 
for non-UK firms.16 
The results in column 4 with excess return as dependent variable do not indicate 
that governance pays off. However, if we again split the sample in non-UK and UK 
firms, we find a highly significant positive coefficient on the interaction term GOV 
t.d. x ΔL XCash / ME for the non-UK firms. This implies that for non-UK firms, the 
marginal value of excess cash is higher for well governed firms than for poorly 
governed firms. For the non-UK firms we calculate the marginal value of €1 of excess 
cash, which is equal to the sum of the coefficient on the change in excess cash (Δ L 
XCash) and the coefficients on the interaction variables that include the change in 
excess cash times the 'in sample means' of the regressors interacting with the change 
in excess cash. The results are remarkable. The marginal value of €1 XCash for the 
non-UK firms following model [5] then is equal to € 1.14 on average. However, the 
value of €1 excess cash is only €0.89 for the lower Governance t.d. quartile and €1.45 
for the upper quartile. This finding is consistent with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007). 
 
4.3 Corporate governance and the use of excess cash 
The results from both the value regressions and returns regressions indicate that 
excess cash held by poorly governed firms in the form of extensive takeover defences 
is valued at a discount. As discussed in the introduction, previous research for US 
firms has documented that poorly governed firms hold relatively high levels of 
(excess) cash and spend their excess cash more quickly than well governed firms. We 
                                                 
16 The difference in the results between non-UK and UK firms could imply that the relevance of 
Shareholder rights for the valuation of unexpected changes in the level of excess cash is higher for non-
UK firms than for UK firms. Alternatively, it could be that for this small sample of UK-firms with in 
general high scores for governance component Takeover defences, it is difficult to capture the effect of 
governance on the value of excess cash. 
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conclude this section by examining whether these findings also apply to our sample of 
European firms.  
First, to analyse the influence of the quality of corporate governance on the level 
of excesss cash holdings, we return to the cash regression model in (1). We re-
estimate this model, but including the corporate governance scores. Results are 
reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6. Actual cash holdings are positively related to 
the total governance rating (see column 4), which is driven by the government 
measure Takeover defences (see column 5). Note that the positive coefficient for 
Takeover defences means that firms with less anti-takeover provisions hold more cash 
than firms with more takeover defences. Since we do not include governance 
variables in our main specification for normal cash holdings as given in (1), this result 
implies that firms with a high score on the corporate governance measure Takeover 
defences hold more excess cash.17 This result is consistent with Harford et al. (2008) 
who find that firms in the U.S. with weaker corporate governance have smaller cash 
reserves.18   
Harford et al. (2008) suggest that firms with weaker corporate governance 
dissipate their cash reserves more quickly than do managers of firms with stronger 
governance, see also Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). To analyze whether similar 
differences in excess cash spending between well and poorly governed firms show up 
in our sample of European firms, we consider those firm-year observations with both 
positive excess cash at time t-1 and a decline in excess cash between t-1 and t. Using 
those observations we regress the change in excess cash on the four governance 
scores including year fixed and firm fixed effects, that is: 
ti
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where Assetsi,t = Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalent at time t-1.  
                                                 
17 If we regress excess cash on the four corporate governance scores, including firm fixed and year 
fixed effects, we find a significant coefficient for governance measure Takeover defences (coefficient 
is 0.005 and a p-value of 0.000) and insignificant coefficients for the other three governance measures. 
18 Our results contrast with Dittmar et al. (2003) who find that corporations in countries (worldwide) 
where shareholder rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as corporations in 
countries with good shareholder protection.  
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The results are presented in column 1 of Table 10. The positive coefficient for 
Takeover defences indicates that the reduction in excess cash is indeed higher for 
firms with a low takeover defences governance score. Put differently, firms with a 
high score for Takeover defences, spend their excess cash less quickly. This finding is 
in agreement with the results by e.g. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Harford et 
al. (2008).19 In column 2 we present the results where the change in Excess cash is 
normalized by the market value of equity at time t-1. The results are similar as in 
column 1.20 
 
- insert Table 10 about here - 
 
The finding that poorly governed firms spend their excess cash more quickly than 
well governed firms need not necessarily be a bad thing. On the contrary, given that 
excess cash is not held for economically motivated purposes, spending it may be 
valued positively. What is crucial, of course, is how management uses the available 
excess cash. The results in Tables 7 and 8, indicating that the value of excess cash for 
poorly governed firms is substantially lower, suggest that those firms may not be 
spending their money in the best possible way. Following Dittmar and Marht-Smith 
(2007), we examine this issue indirectly by analyzing the return on asssets (ROA) for 
those firms spending part of their excess cash. Specifially, we estimate the following 
regression21: 
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19 Pinkowitz (2000) finds that the probability that a firm will be acquired decreases with cash and states 
that managers may hold cash to entrench themselves at shareholder's expense. Following this line of 
reasoning, firms with a high score for Takeover defences may hold higher levels of cash to protect 
themselves from being targeted. 
20 To analyze whether governance influences the decision to accumulate excess cash, we estimate the 
regression in (4) for the sample of firm-year observations with both negative excess cash at time t-1 
and an increase in excess cash between t-1 and t. We do not find any relation between the accumulation 
of excess cash and governance. This finding is in accordance with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
21 The equation is similar to equation (3) of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and controls for size, asset 
structure and lagged industry adjusted ROA.  
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where ROAi,t = EBIT in year t divided by Assets at time t minus Cash and Cash 
Equivalents at time t minus industry average ROA, XCashi,t = Excess Cash at time t (= 
Total Cash and Cash Equivalents minus the normal level of cash from equation (1) at 
time t), GOVi,t-1 is the governance score takeover defences at t-1, Assetsi,t-1 = Total 
Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents at time t, RealNAi,t = Total Assets at time t 
inflated to 2005 prices, PPEi,t = Property, Plant and Equipment at time t.  
We are interested in the coefficient of the interaction term between lagged excess 
cash and the lagged governance measure. A positive coefficient (β3) on this 
interaction term indicates that for every euro of excess cash held at time t-1, firms 
with bad corporate governance who used up excess cash experience a lower ROA in 
that year compared to firms with good corporate governance. The results in Table 11 
show that this indeed is the case, cf. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). The coefficient 
on the interaction term is significantly positive except – surprisingly – for the 
corporate governance measure Takeover defences (see column 3). However, if we 
replace ROAi,t by ROAi,t+1 we find a significantly positive coefficient for takeover 
defences, while the coefficients of the other governance scores remain significantly 
positive.22 
 
- insert Table 11 about here - 
 
The lower value of excess cash held by poorly governed firms could thus be 
explained by the negative influence of their spending on the ROA. Because of the 
lack of corporate control, managers of firms with high management rights can 
potentially destroy value. If these firms had no anti-takeover provisions, the capital 
market would probably have made corrective actions by taking over control in order 
to prevent future wasteful spending.23 
 
                                                 
22 If we regress acquisitions divided by net assets on the lagged amount of excess cash and on total 
governance - including fixed firm and fixed year effect - and we restrict the sample to firms with 
positive lagged excess cash, we find no relation between acquisitions and the quality of corporate 
governance. And we do not find evidence that acquisitions have a significant impact on the return on 
assets.  
23 Faleye (2004) investigates the role of proxy fights in relation to cash holdings. Faleye (2004) finds 
that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms and that following a contest, 
executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance and 
the value of excess cash for large European firms (FTSEurofirst 300). We use 
Deminor ratings for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board as 
proxies for the quality of corporate governance. Following the approach of Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) we first estimate a cash model to determine the level of 
normal cash holdings and subsequently the level of excess cash. Next, we analyze the 
influence of governance on the value of excess cash. We find that the value of excess 
cash is positively related to the governance Takeover defence score only. For non-UK 
firms we find that the value of €1 of excess cash is only €0.89 for the lower Takeover 
defences scores quartile and €1.45 for the upper quartile. Firms that (potentially) 
invest in negative NPV projects, and cannot be corrected by being taken over, are 
valued lower accordingly. We find no relation between the value of excess cash and 
the quality of firms’ corporate governance categories Shareholder rights, Disclosure 
and Board. Given our empirical results, only the market for corporate control seems 
strong enough to prevent managers from wasting excess cash. 
The level of excess cash is also related inversely to the extent of takeover 
defences, while firms with positive excess cash and a low quality of corporate 
governance spend a larger part of their excess cash than firms with a high quality of 
corporate governance. We further find that governance positively influences the ROA 
in the years after the year of spending. If we assume that projects that lower the ROA 
are negative NPV projects, the “value destructive investing behaviour” of poorly 
governed firms could explain the value differential of excess cash between well and 
poorly governed firms. 
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Appendix A Variables and variable codes 
 
The first column shows the variable name and the second columns shows the database 
identifiers. WS stands for Worldscope database. DS stands for Datastream database, 
TF stands for Thomson Financial Database. 
 
Table A.1 Data variables identifiers 
Variable     Identifier 
Acquisitions     WS.NetAssetsFrAcquisitionsCFStmt 
Capital Expenditures    WS.CapitalExpendCFstd 
Cash and Cash Equivalents   WS.CashAndEquivGeneric 
Cash Flow     WS.CashFlow 
Dividend     WS.CommonDividendsCash 
EBIT      WS.EarningsBeforeInterestAndTaxes 
EBITDA     WS.EarningsBeforeIntTaxesAndDepr 
Income Tax     WS.IncomeTaxes 
Industry code     WS.IndustryGroup 
Interest expenses    TF.InterestExpenseonDebt 
Long Term Debt Issuance   WS.LTDebtIssuanceCFStmt 
Long Term Debt Reduction   WS.LTDebtReductionCFStmt 
Market capitalization    WS.YrEndMarketCap 
Working Capital    WS.WorkingCapBalSht 
Property, Plant & Equipment   WS.TotalPropPlantEquipNet 
Purchase of Common & Preferred Stock WS.PurchOfComAndPfdStkCFStmt 
R&D         WS.ResearchAndDevelopmentExpense 
Return index     DS.ReturnIndex 
Return on Assets    WS.ReturnOnAssets 
Sale of Common & Preferred Stock  WS.SaleOfComAndPfdStkCFStmt 
Sales Growth 3Yr     WS.Sales3YrGrowth 
Share Price     DS.PriceClose 
Total Assets     WS.TotalAssets 
Total Debt     WS.TotalDebt 
Total shares outstanding   DS.CommonSharesOutstanding 
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Appendix B Cash-to-assets per country, 2000-2004 
 
Table B.1 Summary statistics of cash-to-assets by country, 2000-2004. 
The cash-to-assets ratio is defined as Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets, where Net 
Assets is Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents. The cash-to-assets ratio is winsorized at the 
mean plus and minus three times the standard deviation. The rightmost column in the table shows the 
number of observations. 
 
Country 25th 75th
 Mean Percentile  Median Percentile  Std. Dev. N
Austria 0.030 0.005 0.027 0.041 0.032 15
Belgium 0.118 0.043 0.088 0.174 0.088 30
Switzerland 0.244 0.101 0.225 0.357 0.174 90
Denmark 0.126 0.062 0.113 0.158 0.088 24
Finland 0.172 0.018 0.028 0.159 0.291 20
France 0.167 0.055 0.106 0.186 0.184 234
Germany 0.126 0.035 0.075 0.162 0.143 165
Greece 0.172 0.010 0.045 0.149 0.274 25
Ireland 0.455 0.160 0.322 0.830 0.319 15
Itlay 0.094 0.043 0.083 0.125 0.089 73
Luxembourg 0.066 0.047 0.056 0.083 0.031 15
Netherlands 0.164 0.053 0.099 0.219 0.158 80
Norway 0.169 0.073 0.097 0.256 0.153 20
Portugal 0.081 0.012 0.027 0.184 0.096 10
Spain 0.114 0.024 0.079 0.137 0.123 80
Sweden 0.168 0.044 0.082 0.156 0.230 70
United Kingdom 0.133 0.037 0.070 0.156 0.162 374
All 0.149 0.041 0.087 0.177 0.173 1340   
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Appendix C Cash-to-assets per industry, 2000-2004 
 
Table C.1 Summary statistics of cash-to-assets by industry, 2000-2004. 
The cash-to-assets ratio is defined as Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets, where Net 
Assets is Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents. The cash-to-assets ratio is winsorized at the 
mean plus and minus three times the standard deviation. The rightmost column in the table shows the 
number of observations. 
 
Industry 25th 75th
 Mean Percentile  Median Percentile  Std. Dev. N
Aerospace 0.210 0.127 0.179 0.245 0.109 15
Apparel 0.100 0.028 0.109 0.156 0.062 10
Automotive 0.144 0.071 0.107 0.137 0.128 50
Beverages 0.063 0.026 0.052 0.088 0.046 35
Chemicals 0.100 0.033 0.065 0.151 0.088 99
Construction 0.129 0.068 0.118 0.151 0.089 80
Diversified 0.134 0.046 0.084 0.161 0.134 80
Drugs, cosmetics and health care 0.262 0.115 0.253 0.367 0.197 85
Electrical 0.157 0.083 0.134 0.210 0.097 22
Electronics 0.314 0.107 0.217 0.399 0.273 80
Food 0.170 0.062 0.087 0.224 0.164 40
Machinery and equipment 0.190 0.042 0.068 0.349 0.200 35
Metal producers 0.089 0.052 0.070 0.112 0.073 25
Metal product manufacturers 0.107 0.045 0.060 0.160 0.086 20
Oil, gas, coal and related services 0.053 0.032 0.041 0.068 0.036 44
Paper 0.023 0.017 0.024 0.027 0.008 15
Printing and publishing 0.154 0.024 0.053 0.159 0.231 48
Recreation 0.074 0.022 0.049 0.101 0.084 40
Retialers 0.143 0.052 0.087 0.146 0.175 89
Textiles 0.143 0.106 0.135 0.175 0.043 5
Tobacco 0.142 0.058 0.131 0.181 0.103 20
Transportation 0.232 0.074 0.108 0.251 0.250 39
Utilities 0.090 0.019 0.050 0.107 0.125 203
Miscellaneous 0.181 0.048 0.118 0.203 0.208 161
All 0.149 0.041 0.087 0.177 0.173 1340  
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Table 1. Corporate governance scores per year, 2000-2004 
Year Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board
rights defences N
 Mean Standard
deviation
2000 19.02 6.38 6.01 3.82 4.88 4.35 150
2001 20.69 6.58 6.26 4.14 5.65 4.64 166
2002 20.98 6.27 6.36 3.86 6.03 4.74 191
2003 22.48 6.19 6.58 3.89 6.73 5.28 194
2004 23.84 5.65 6.89 4.05 7.06 5.83 204
All 21.57 6.39 6.45 3.95 6.15 5.02 905
Governance total
 
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores per year for Shareholder rights, 
Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation is 
shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
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Table 2. Corporate governance scores by country, 2000-2004 
Country Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board
rights defences N
 Mean Standard
deviation
Austria 17.61 2.01 7.36 0.81 5.83 3.61 3
Belgium 17.45 3.17 6.51 1.64 4.67 4.63 21
Switzerland 16.61 6.05 5.58 2.28 4.78 3.96 53
Denmark 15.60 3.90 6.05 1.35 4.86 3.35 17
Finland 23.55 3.97 6.98 5.64 6.12 4.80 18
France 20.79 4.59 6.40 3.42 5.83 5.14 163
Germany 18.92 3.97 7.18 2.88 5.48 3.38 113
Greece 16.80 3.06 6.97 1.29 4.84 3.71 7
Ireland 28.09 2.11 6.65 8.09 6.90 6.45 11
Italy 19.55 3.00 6.18 1.42 6.97 4.98 40
Luxembourg 12.08 5.35 4.01 0.50 3.96 3.61 2
Netherlands 17.23 5.47 4.89 1.97 5.99 4.39 71
Norway 18.95 4.06 7.59 2.91 4.66 3.79 16
Portugal 12.13 3.23 4.13 0.25 4.68 3.07 8
Spain 16.60 3.38 5.58 1.08 5.26 4.68 43
Sweden 19.27 4.95 5.93 4.09 5.13 4.12 55
United Kingdom 27.93 4.77 7.02 6.79 7.56 6.56 264
All 21.57 6.39 6.45 3.95 6.15 5.02 905
Governance total
 
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores by country for Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation 
is shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
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Table 3. Corporate governance scores by industry, 2000-2004 
Industry Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board
rights defences N
 Mean Standard
deviation
Aerospace 18.73 2.06 5.22 0.25 7.32 5.93 12
Apparel 21.71 5.85 7.25 5.15 5.65 3.67 3
Automotive 19.59 4.42 6.30 3.73 5.58 3.98 43
Beverages 23.30 6.40 7.12 3.89 6.54 5.75 23
Chemicals 21.02 6.59 6.46 4.12 5.74 4.70 76
Construction 24.98 5.13 6.75 6.05 6.51 5.67 32
Diversified 20.45 5.09 6.52 3.67 5.59 4.67 59
Drugs, cosmetics and health care 20.53 6.72 6.62 3.22 5.99 4.74 67
Electrical 21.45 4.15 6.36 3.91 6.02 5.16 18
Electronics 21.75 5.78 6.39 4.20 6.23 4.93 60
Food 22.58 7.06 6.06 4.46 6.77 5.38 35
Machinery and equipment 21.39 5.32 6.46 5.96 5.14 3.83 27
Metal producers 25.57 5.74 6.59 4.60 7.60 6.77 15
Metal product manufacturers 25.55 7.52 6.84 6.69 6.50 5.52 10
Oil, gas, coal and related services 22.69 6.45 6.35 3.56 6.92 5.86 30
Paper 20.57 4.71 6.14 4.38 5.67 4.37 15
Printing and publishing 22.86 7.30 5.82 4.99 6.60 5.45 36
Recreation 21.73 5.32 7.12 3.13 6.34 5.15 18
Retailers 23.19 6.86 6.88 4.73 6.20 5.37 68
Textiles 22.21 0.30 8.11 0.50 7.03 6.57 2
Tobacco 26.30 6.19 6.81 6.40 6.87 6.21 19
Transportation 19.53 5.56 6.19 2.09 6.44 4.81 22
Utilities 19.53 6.74 6.17 2.59 6.01 4.76 149
Miscellaneous 22.91 6.69 6.70 4.70 6.27 5.24 66
All 21.57 6.39 6.45 3.95 6.15 5.02 905
Governance total
 
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores by industry for Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation 
is shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
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Table 4. Summary statistics cash-to-assets ratio by country, 1990-2005 
The cash-to-assets ratio is defined as Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets, where Net 
Assets is Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents. The cash-to-assets ratio is winsorized at the 
mean plus and minus three times the standard deviation. 
 
Country 25th 75th
 Mean Percentile  Median Percentile  Std. Dev. N
Austria 0.038 0.007 0.027 0.051 0.038 41
Belgium 0.109 0.035 0.071 0.173 0.101 93
Switzerland 0.263 0.091 0.225 0.376 0.208 235
Denmark 0.176 0.086 0.141 0.240 0.131 54
Finland 0.137 0.027 0.044 0.152 0.209 61
France 0.152 0.062 0.104 0.179 0.157 691
Germany 0.150 0.048 0.101 0.204 0.153 466
Greece 0.156 0.012 0.057 0.150 0.238 46
Ireland 0.458 0.190 0.405 0.738 0.265 37
Italy 0.123 0.042 0.093 0.158 0.116 212
Luxembourg 0.119 0.053 0.080 0.125 0.120 32
Netherlands 0.147 0.051 0.090 0.194 0.151 238
Norway 0.178 0.064 0.087 0.342 0.176 56
Portugal 0.060 0.003 0.013 0.060 0.096 24
Spain 0.095 0.017 0.060 0.137 0.104 239
Sweden 0.177 0.050 0.108 0.197 0.209 204
United Kingdom 0.157 0.043 0.093 0.194 0.178 1102
All 0.156 0.046 0.099 0.197 0.172 3831  
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Table 5. Summary statistics cash-to-assets ratio by industry, 1990-2005 
The cash-to-assets ratio is defined as Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets, where Net 
Assets is Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents. The cash-to-assets ratio is winsorized at the 
mean plus and minus three times the standard deviation. 
 
Industry 25th 75th
 Mean Percentile  Median Percentile  Std. Dev. N
Aerospace 0.223 0.170 0.200 0.253 0.083 40
Apparel 0.154 0.029 0.119 0.255 0.134 31
Automotive 0.167 0.086 0.137 0.200 0.126 149
Beverages 0.093 0.038 0.071 0.127 0.077 110
Chemicals 0.091 0.038 0.065 0.129 0.073 274
Construction 0.146 0.067 0.115 0.171 0.132 235
Diversified 0.155 0.063 0.106 0.175 0.143 247
Drugs, cosmetics and health care 0.283 0.121 0.244 0.389 0.215 234
Electrical 0.128 0.082 0.108 0.157 0.073 53
Electronics 0.283 0.127 0.203 0.338 0.234 241
Food 0.188 0.072 0.100 0.258 0.179 118
Machinery and equipment 0.193 0.050 0.183 0.271 0.165 99
Metal producers 0.129 0.067 0.107 0.155 0.102 64
Metal product manufacturers 0.110 0.050 0.066 0.141 0.100 60
Oil, gas, coal and related services 0.066 0.031 0.052 0.084 0.052 133
Paper 0.034 0.021 0.030 0.042 0.017 45
Printing and publishing 0.128 0.026 0.064 0.150 0.173 148
Recreation 0.109 0.038 0.077 0.130 0.105 119
Retialers 0.158 0.053 0.086 0.163 0.193 280
Textiles 0.153 0.113 0.135 0.196 0.048 7
Tobacco 0.122 0.045 0.097 0.181 0.094 52
Transportation 0.209 0.075 0.132 0.243 0.204 97
Utilities 0.082 0.014 0.039 0.101 0.116 553
Miscellaneous 0.214 0.059 0.154 0.253 0.221 442
All 0.156 0.046 0.099 0.197 0.172 3831  
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Table 6. Normal cash model 
This table shows the regression results of the cash models. In all variables Assets are net of Cash. The 
dependent variable is the ratio Cash / assets. The independent variables include: Size (natural logarithm 
of the firm real assets), Market-to-Book ((Market capitalization + Total Debt) / Assets), Cash Flow / 
Assets, NWC / Assets (Net Working Capital / Assets), Sigma (Industry Cash Flow volatility over past 
6 years), R&D / Assets (Research and Development, set to zero if missing), Leverage (Total Debt / 
Assets), Capex / Assets (Capital Expenditures / Assets), Dividend Dummy (set to 1 if the firm pays 
dividend, zero otherwise), Governance total (sum of Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure 
and Board), Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. Regressions are made with 
firm fixed and year fixed effects. OLS regression is used with White's heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Predicted
Variables sign [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Size ? 0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.010 -0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016)
Market to Book + 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.011 0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Cash Flow / Assets + 0.379*** 0.445*** 0.482*** 0.271*** 0.281***
(0.095) (0.104) (0.104) (0.094) (0.099)
NWC / Assets - -0.233*** -0.193*** -0.191*** -0.271*** -0.268***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.062) (0.059)
Sigma + 0.625*** 0.602*** 0.673*** 0.440*** 0.445***
(0.074) (0.077) (0.071) (0.150) (0.156)
R&D / Assets + 1.144*** 1.114*** 2.237*** 2.243***
(0.143) (0.139) (0.356) (0.373)
Leverage ? 0.115*** 0.122***
(0.020) (0.016)
Capex / Assets + -0.037
(0.061)
Dividend Dummy - -0.008 -0.010
(0.006) (0.007)
Governance total 0.002**
(0.001)
Shareholder rights -0.002
(0.004)
Takeover defences 0.005***
(0.001)
Disclosure -0.003
(0.003)
Board -0.001
(0.006)
Constant -0.031 -0.024 -0.009 0.049 0.128
(0.072) (0.068) (0.074) (0.150) (0.176)
Adjusted partial R ² 0.200 0.208 0.185 0.254 0.255
Sample Size 3154 3142 3154 842 842
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Table 7. Value models 
This table shows the regression results for the value regressions. All models are estimated with firm 
and year fixed effects. In all variables Assets are net of Cash. The dependent variable in all models is 
the ratio of firm's market value to assets. The independent variables include the following variables 
over assets: Earnings, R&D, Dividend, Interest, Assets, Market Value and Excess Cash. Excess cash is 
computed as the residual from model [1] in Table 6. In model [2]-[5] X is equal to, Shareholder rights, 
Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board respectively. In model [1] X is equal to the sum of 
Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. Δ L Y indicates a change in Y from time 
t-1 to t. Δ Y indicates a change in Y from time t to t+1. All models use only firms with positive excess 
cash. OLS regression is used with White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors 
are presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 level, respectively. 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Earnings / Assets 2.507*** 1.979*** 2.788*** 2.013*** 1.984***
(0.616) (0.709) (0.757) (0.614) (0.716)
Δ L Earnings / Assets -0.256 0.074 -0.376 -0.036 0.066
(0.246) (0.173) (0.285) (0.178) (0.198)
Δ Earnings / Assets 1.062 1.008 1.142* 1.017 1.024
(0.652) (0.807) (0.645) (0.673) (0.792)
R&D / Assets 7.525** 5.265** 10.059*** 5.026** 6.092*
(3.273) (2.602) (3.377) (2.118) (3.157)
Δ L R&D / Assets 1.744 2.951 1.554 1.720 3.025
(3.485) (3.405) (2.848) (3.812) (3.277)
Δ R&D / Assets 8.127*** 8.195*** 8.786*** 8.271*** 8.553***
(2.479) (2.820) (2.153) (2.274) (2.826)
Dividend / Assets 1.541*** 1.824*** 1.394*** 1.588*** 1.852***
(0.324) (0.277) (0.287) (0.322) (0.317)
Δ L Dividend / Assets 2.624* 1.551 3.283*** 2.585 1.427
(1.545) (1.229) (1.052) (1.696) (1.485)
Δ Dividend / Assets -0.009 -0.072 0.001 0.042 -0.097
(0.283) (0.315) (0.292) (0.208) (0.273)
Interest / Assets -11.462 -15.611 -9.618 -10.183 -17.429
(12.375) (12.643) (7.936) (12.846) (11.633)
Δ L Interest / Assets -0.450 -1.650 -0.508 -1.440 -1.389
(1.881) (2.135) (3.535) (2.213) (2.034)
Δ Interest / Assets -15.169 -18.300 -14.273 -14.094 -19.046
(13.614) (12.733) (10.122) (12.737) (12.344)
Δ L NA / Assets 0.250* 0.289* 0.192 0.301*** 0.263
(0.149) (0.147) (0.121) (0.107) (0.162)
Δ NA / Assets 0.429** 0.458** 0.349*** 0.463** 0.466**
(0.194) (0.178) (0.130) (0.214) (0.207)
Δ MV / Assets -0.513*** -0.499*** -0.496*** -0.518*** -0.491***
(0.084) (0.078) (0.085) (0.070) (0.075)
Excess Cash / Assets -1.175 2.652 0.191 -0.556 2.151
(1.214) (1.750) (0.633) (2.258) (1.414)
Governance X -0.006 0.062 -0.078 0.066* -0.007
(0.019) (0.039) (0.052) (0.035) (0.031)
Governance X x Excess Cash / Assets 0.145** -0.152 0.508** 0.377 -0.080
(0.069) (0.288) (0.242) (0.396) (0.292)
Constant 1.270** 0.941*** 1.274*** 0.854*** 1.361***
(0.514) (0.139) (0.195) (0.123) (0.211)
Adjusted partial R ² 0.629 0.620 0.649 0.630 0.618
Sample Size 256 256 256 256 256
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Table 8. Alternative value models (robustness) 
This table shows the regression results for the value regressions. All models are estimated with firm 
and year fixed effects. In all variables Assets are net of Cash. The dependent variable in all models is 
the ratio of firm's market value to assets. The independent variables include the following variables 
over assets: Earnings, R&D, Dividend, Interest, Assets, Market Value, Normal Cash and Excess Cash. 
Normal cash is computed with the estimated model [1] in Table 6; Excess cash is computed as the 
residual from model [1] in Table 6. Gov. TD is the governance score for Takeover defences. Δ L Y 
indicates a change in Y from time t-1 to t. Δ Y indicates a change in Y from time t to t+1. OLS 
regression is used with White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors are 
presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
level, respectively. 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Earnings / Assets 2.981*** 2.963*** 2.250*** 2.331***
(0.823) (0.770) (0.709) (0.631)
Δ L Earnings / Assets -0.365 -0.311
(0.286) (0.252)
Δ Earnings / Assets 1.206* 1.206* 0.865 0.918
(0.692) (0.676) (0.685) (0.615)
R&D / Assets 10.768*** 10.425*** 14.387** 13.635**
(3.195) (3.504) (6.202) (6.145)
Δ L R&D / Assets 1.511 1.301
(2.798) (2.979)
Δ R&D / Assets 8.640*** 8.276*** 12.058*** 11.399***
(2.192) (1.999) (1.829) (2.087)
Dividend / Assets 1.368*** 1.348*** 1.650*** 1.604***
(0.272) (0.281) (0.341) (0.362)
Δ L Dividend / Assets 3.494*** 3.464*** 3.675*** 3.631**
(0.844) (0.958) (1.334) (1.427)
Δ Dividend / Assets -0.002 0.012
(0.285) (0.277)
Interest / Assets -9.871 -10.180
(7.983) (8.456)
Δ L Interest / Assets -0.679 -0.877
(3.582) (3.911)
Δ Interest / Assets -14.487 -14.589
(10.094) (9.641)
Δ L NA / Assets 0.189 0.220* 0.232 0.261
(0.119) (0.124) (0.186) (0.188)
Δ NA / Assets 0.383** 0.395**
(0.157) (0.159)
Δ MV / Assets -0.501*** -0.500*** -0.522*** -0.517***
(0.090) (0.093) (0.072) (0.076)
Normal cash / Assets -0.609 0.264 -0.204 1.304
(0.993) (1.610) (0.830) (1.599)
Excess Cash / Assets 0.217 0.086 0.161 -0.115
(0.618) (0.561) (0.690) (0.692)
Gov. t.d. -0.078 -0.052 -0.080 -0.040
(0.051) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
Gov. t.d. x Normal Cash / Assets -0.163 -0.259
(0.161) (0.246)
Gov. t.d. x Excess Cash / Assets 0.514** 0.531** 0.418** 0.471**
(0.241) (0.235) (0.173) (0.205)
Constant 1.332*** 1.210*** 1.119*** 0.892***
(0.277) (0.354) (0.180) (0.336)
Adjusted partial R ² 0.648 0.655 0.629 0.640
Sample Size 256 256 257 257  
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Table 9. Return models 
This table shows the regression results for the return regressions. All models are estimated with firm 
and year fixed effects. ME is the market value of equity at t-1. The dependent variable in models [1]-
[3] is MEt minus MEt-1 divided by MEt-1. De dependent variable in models [4]-[6] is the annual market 
model excess return.  Model [1] and [4] include all observations. Model [2] and [5] include the 
observations for non UK firms only and model [3] and [6] for UK firms only. Models [1]-[6] include 
observations only if XCasht-1 is positive. Δ L X indicates a change in X from time t-1 to t. Governance 
t.d. is the governance score for Takeover defences. OLS regression is used with White's 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard erros are presented between parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Δ L XCash / ME 1.418** 1.183* 0.377 0.998 0.931 -8.438
(0.563) (0.669) (2.696) (0.665) (0.663) (16.061)
Δ L Earnings / ME 1.231*** 0.399 1.238 0.206 0.428*** 0.739
(0.256) (0.484) (1.458) (0.422) (0.111) (4.002)
Δ L Net Assets / ME 0.110** -0.136 0.359 -0.085 -0.045 4.227
(0.053) (0.111) (0.366) (0.122) (0.108) (2.061)
Δ L R&D / ME 0.053 -0.516 -11.183 2.924*** 1.918 -82.567
(1.149) (1.380) (14.072) (0.941) (1.383) (146.365)
Δ L Interest / ME -2.801*** -1.288 16.495 -6.112** -5.952*** 13.518
(0.796) (1.999) (23.495) (2.917) (1.386) (24.454)
Δ L Dividend / ME 4.104* 1.658 5.539 -1.968 0.739 -18.536
(2.202) (1.691) (8.132) (2.129) (1.382) (34.370)
Lagged Xcash / ME 3.052*** 2.329*** 3.093 2.313*** 2.268*** 8.062**
(0.738) (0.748) (1.922) (0.689) (0.467) (2.041)
Leverage -1.297*** -1.382*** -1.746 -1.279*** -1.731*** 1.846
(0.414) (0.325) (1.052) (0.286) (0.207) (3.017)
New Finance / ME 0.029*** 0.228 0.010 -0.063 0.008 -4.318**
(0.008) (0.362) (0.017) (0.447) (0.341) (0.954)
Lagged XCash / ME x Δ L XCash / ME 2.101 5.519*** -3.631 1.041 2.180 -5.974
(1.474) (1.084) (7.760) (0.737) (1.584) (8.949)
Leverage x Δ L XCash / ME -0.872 -3.938*** -1.532 -0.051 -1.215** -15.227
(0.727) (0.443) (5.575) (0.920) (0.568) (30.944)
Governance t.d. x  Δ L XCash / ME 0.086*** 0.197*** 0.559 -0.012 0.110*** 2.932
(0.031) (0.067) (0.320) (0.030) (0.028) (3.359)
Governance t.d. 0.035 0.014 0.009 -0.007 0.038 -0.212
(0.022) (0.038) (0.119) (0.031) (0.037) (0.181)
Constant -0.037 0.175 0.299 0.165 0.178 0.327
(0.118) (0.231) (0.619) (0.172) (0.138) (1.443)
Adjusted partial R ² 0.542 0.579 0.735 0.374 0.449 0.645
Sample Size 192 147 45 188 147 41
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Table 10. Spending excess cash and corporate governance 
This table shows the regression results of the change in Excess Cash on the Governance scores. Assets 
are net of Cash. The dependent variable in model [1] is the ratio (ExcessCashi,t- ExcessCashi,t-1) / 
Assetsi,t-1 and in model [2] (ExcessCashi,t- ExcessCashi,t-1) / MEi,t-1  where MEi,t-1 = Market value of 
Equity at time t-1. The independent variables include the Governance scores Shareholder rights, 
Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. The sample is the intersection of firms with positive lagged 
excess cash and firms for which excess cash declined over the year; i.e. for model (ExcessCashi,t- 
ExcessCashi,t-1) / Assetsi,t-1 < 0 and for model [2] (ExcessCashi,t- ExcessCashi,t-1) / MEi,t-1 <0. 
Regressions are made with firm fixed and year fixed effects. OLS regression is used with White's 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Predicted
Variables sign [1] [2]
Corporate governance
Shareholder rights + 0.005 0.001
(0.016) (0.025)
Takeover defences + 0.016** 0.022**
(0.007) (0.009)
Disclosure + -0.010 -0.025
(0.013) (0.024)
Board + -0.010 0.003
(0.010) (0.033)
Constant -0.062 -0.039
(0.099) (0.155)
Adjusted partial R² 0.578 0.443
Sample Size 119 119  
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Table 11. The impact of the use of excess cash and corporate governance on the ROA 
This table shows the regression results for the return on assets regressions. The dependent variable is 
ROA (EBIT over Assets) minus industry average ROA. Assets are computed net of cash. In model [2]-
[5] X (X in governance X) is equal to, Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board 
respectively. In model [1] X is equal to the sum of Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure 
and Board. Independent variables are: one-year lagged excess cash to assets, one-year lagged 
governance scores X, the interaction between lagged excess cash and lagged governance, Size (LN 
RealAssets), property, plant and equipment to assets (PPE/Assets),  and lagged industry adjusted ROA. 
The sample is the intersection of firms with positive lagged excess cash and firms for which excess 
cash declined over the year; i.e. (ExcessCashi,t- ExcessCashi,t-1) / Assetsi,t-1 < 0. Regressions are made 
with firm fixed and year fixed effects. OLS regression is used with White's heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Lagged Xcash -0.247 -0.198 0.058 -0.976*** -0.478
(0.310) (0.291) (0.179) (0.236) (0.285)
Lagged Governance X -0.001 -0.014 -0.004** -0.008 -0.002
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Lagged Xcash x Lagged Governance X 0.018* 0.057* 0.018 0.172*** 0.108***
(0.009) (0.031) (0.013) (0.029) (0.032)
Size -0.112*** -0.132*** -0.137*** -0.091*** -0.103***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.036)
PPE / Assets -0.807* -0.856* -0.900* -0.660* -0.787*
(0.425) (0.457) (0.457) (0.379) (0.408)
Lagged ROA 0.104 0.123 0.111 0.055 0.114
(0.117) (0.102) (0.116) (0.111) (0.119)
Contant 1.278*** 1.548*** 1.541*** 1.079*** 1.190***
(0.326) (0.369) (0.252) (0.308) (0.308)
Adjusted partial R ² 0.363 0.237 0.207 0.477 0.417
Sample Size 143 143 143 143 143  
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